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Abstract
Deliberative models of democratic education encourage the discussion of controversial issues in the
classroom (e.g., Hess, 2009); however, they tend to curtail conflicts for the sake of consensus.
Agonism, on the other hand, can help support the deliberative model by attending to antagonism in
productive ways (Ruitenberg, 2009). In this paper, I present how agonistic deliberation (the infusion
of agonism into deliberation) can work as an account of the political that may help empower young
people. The paper presents two classic democratic classroom practices—structured academic controversy (SAC) and debate—together as examples of how agonistic deliberation can help students engage
politically. This paper suggests that while deliberation can help students learn about political participation, agonistic deliberation (with its focus on conflict) has the potential to help students harness
social frustrations into political action.
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A

t the turn of the 21st century, Francis
Fukuyama (2006) proclaimed that liberal democracy was the ultimate solution to the world’s most
difficult questions. Democratic educators, in kind, have touted the
importance of classroom discussions in support of a Habermasian
liberal democracy (e.g., Allen, 2006; Hess, 2009; Parker, 2006). In
recent times, political polarization, racial divides, and terrorist
threats seem to overshadow the kind of consensus that may be
obtained through liberal democratic dialogue (e.g.,
Is it possible for legislatures to engage in productive deliberations
that yield consensus in order to avoid gridlock? Or can we find our
common humanity through dialogue while extremist views
propagate in the media?) As young people self-segregate through
social media for solace, camaraderie, or ways to vent their
democracy & education, vol 25, n-o 1

frustrations, one begins to wonder if consensus building through
deliberative dialogue in democratic classrooms can help them
engage politically.1 Put another way, might deliberative practices in
1 See Berger’s (2009) distinction of political engagement from civic or
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classrooms encourage students to become more interested and
involved in politics or do the conversations simply make them
more cynical? Readers of this journal are accustomed to articles
that engage both educational philosophy and the field of curriculum and instruction (e.g., Hyde & LaPrad, 2015; Parker, 2011;
Peterson, 2014); this paper utilizes political philosophy alongside
curriculum and instruction to explore these questions.
While teaching students to rationally engage in dialogue
around controversial issues can help broaden their perspectives
(Hess, 2009; Lo, 2015), these deliberations may subtly circumvent
antagonisms that naturally fuel the political. For example, Hess
(2009) suggested that as conflict arises, political tolerance, or “the
willingness to extend important and significant rights (such as free
speech) to people who are different from oneself,” (p. 16) is an
essential aspect of highly diverse democracies. Political tolerance
may be an important skill for students to acquire, but its connotation suggests commonality is more important than disagreements.
For students who already feel distant from the status quo, this
emphasis on what we have in common may accentuate their lack of
power in the current system, especially if they were not involved
when the commonalities were first deduced. This sense of marginalization is evident in cases of bio-disasters, where individuals who
suffered environmental accidents feel disenfranchised by the
solution process because they did not have equal access to the
deliberative processes that yielded the solutions (Shiva, 1999).
Drawing on the work of Mouffe and Ruitenberg, I show how
agonistic deliberation may help empower students who feel
marginalized by the status quo. With its emphasis on both conflict
and conciliation, an agonistic deliberative model may expose
students to inherent power struggles that exist in a pluralistic
democracy. Before attending to how agonism and the political can
help empower students, I first define agonism through a discussion
of the political (via the works of Schmitt, Arendt, Rawls, and
Habermas). Second, I discuss why agonism is essential to a
pluralistic democracy. Third, to help educators understand how
agonism can impact democratic education, I present it as a contrast
to a generic deliberative model of democratic education. finally,
I show how agonistic deliberation in the classroom may help
empower students who feel disenfranchised by existing systems.

The Political in Two Substantiations
Before diving into how agonism is reflected in the political, let
me suggest that pluralism is at the heart of agonism and the
political. Pluralism, as defined by Berlin (1997), suggests a
coexistence of diverse and competing ideological systems.
A pluralistic democracy, therefore, is a society governed by a
diverse populace, whose comprehensive ideals of what it means
to “live well” is often in contention with one another. It is within
this pluralistic democracy that conflict, conciliation, and the
political exists.
Since “the political” is debated among political philosophers,
in this paper, I draw upon the works of Schmitt, Arendt, Mouffe,
Rawls, and Habermas to paint a picture of what I mean by the

political. Different from politics—which are processes, practices,
and discourses that seek to establish order in human existence—
the political consists of natural conflicts that arise from pluralistic
society (Mouffe, 1999). One can imagine that politics is the process
of getting one’s neighbors to compromise on a speed bump
installation down the street, whereas the political is the vehement
disagreements among neighbors about whether there should be a
speed bump to begin with. This conflictual antagonism within
human relations is at the heart of the political. However, agonism
differs from conflictual antagonism in that it attempts to harness
this conflict for productive ends.

The Political as Conflict
Pushing the antagonistic envelope to extremes, Schmitt (2007) offers
a criterion and expression of the political through a distinction: that
of friend and enemy. Schmitt claimed that this distinction offers a
way through which “all action with a specific political meaning can
be traced” (p. 26). All things political, then, will include the ultimate
tension between friend and enemy. Three ideas are crucial to
Schmitt’s friend-and-enemy distinction. First, the friend-and-enemy
distinction must be serious and severe, resulting always in the
possibility (not necessarily the reality) of war and death of one’s
enemy. “The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real
meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of
physical killing” (p. 33). This leads directly to Schmitt’s second idea,
where “the political entity is by its very nature the decisive entity”
(p. 43). This means that the political is not associational or cohesive;
it exists only where the decisive, and therefore divisive, resides. The
third idea, by nature of the first, is that the enemy is “solely the public
enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue
of such a relationship” (p. 28). All things political are in the realms of
the public, affecting a collectivity of people, which means that the
enemy Schmitt alluded to can never just be the private adversary of
one individual.
Schmitt (2007) contended not only that the political deals
with the public but also that conflict is an essential aspect of the
political existence. “As long as a state exists, there will thus always
be in the world more than just one state. A world state which
embraces the entire globe and all of humanity cannot exist” (p. 53).
Schmitt argued that the existence of such a globalized world would
negate the political. “What remains is neither politics nor state, but
culture, civilization, economics, morality, law, art, entertainment,
etc.” (p. 53). While he has admitted that “in a good world among
good people, only peace, security, and harmony prevail” (p. 65),
Schmitt does not believe this is possible, because humans are
inherently divisive. Therefore, the political (or the friend-and-
enemy distinction) exists as a part of humanity. In this interpretation of the political, Schmitt provided a very realistic account of the
antagonism that exists in the world, without providing any lofty
notions of peace or harmony. While Schmitt presented the political
as a conflict-ridden entity, with no possible resolutions, Arendt
focused on the unpredictable, yet creative, consequences of
political conflict and action.
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In The Human Condition, Arendt (1998) outlined the fundamental aspects of the human condition from the perspectives of
vita activa in three forms: labor, work, and action—of which action
is explored in this paper. Arendt suggested, “Plurality is the
condition of human action because we are all the same, that is,
human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else
who ever lived, lives, or will live” (p. 8). This sameness in our
differences drives us and conditions us in such a way that our
actions are what make us human. At the same time, “though the
common world is the common meeting ground of all, those who
are present have different locations in it, and the location of one
can no more coincide with the location of another than the
location of two objects” (p. 57). This means that even though there
may be some similarities among us (e.g., some of us live in the same
cities), our distinct experiences make even these shared similarities
uniquely individual. Put another way, even the things we have in
common will never be exactly the same. These varying positionalities in the world complicate and enrich our human experiences—
and it is this complication that ultimately makes us human.
Like Schmitt, Arendt recognized the world is pluralistic by
nature. This means conflict is inescapable. Also like Schmitt,
Arendt believed that the political belongs in the public realm,
because political actions impact all who are involved. However,
unlike Schmitt, who has seen conflict as a never-ending reality of
the political that should be preserved, Arendt saw conflict as an
opportunity for human action. Arendt (1998) suggested that “an
element of action, and therefore of natality, is inherent in all human
activities” (p. 9). This means that humans are bound by actions
through vita activa—our actions upon things and people are a part
of the human condition and continuously determine the trajectory of
human existence. Our actions are ever present, but they become
problematic because they are inherently unpredictable and often
irreversible. These actions can result in more unforeseeable
conflicts, which propel the existence of the political.
Since we cannot always understand or guarantee the potentialities of our actions, the consequences of these actions can result
in conflicts that cripple or impede the possibility of future actions.
So how might we get past these conflicts? Arendt suggested that
forgiveness is the only way forward. She argued that a “possible
redemption from the predicament of irreversibility—of being
unable to undo what one has done though one did not, and could
not, have known what he was doing—is the faculty of forgiving”
(Arendt, 1998, p. 237). Forgiveness becomes the linchpin upon
which human existence can continue and progress. “Without being
forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done,
our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed
from which we could never recover; we could remain the victims of
its consequences forever” (Arendt, 1998, p. 237). The power of
forgiveness creates hope for impending renegotiations and
provides future generations the freedom to act in courageous ways
for the betterment of human existence.
At the same time, action (along with speech) requires a
togetherness of people, where “[people] show who they are, reveal
actively their unique personal identities and thus make their
appearance in the human world” (Arendt, 1998, p. 179). And these
democracy & education, vol 25, n-o 1

dialogues should occur specifically in the public realm because the
“revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where
people are with others and neither for nor against them—that is, in
sheer human togetherness” (Arendt, 1998, p. 180). For Arendt, the
political exists in this pluralistic negotiation and renegotiation of
actions and speech. She was not promoting a harmonious existence where conflict is absolved, nor is she arguing for a world
where conflict is preserved; instead, Arendt was suggesting that the
public should be restored and preserved so that agonism and its
outcomes can exist. As Arendt (1998) pointed out, an “emergence
of society . . . from the shadowy interior of the household into
the light of the public sphere, has not only blurred the old borderline between private and political, it has also changed almost
beyond recognition the meaning of the two terms and their
significance for the life of the individual and the citizen” (p. 38).
For Arendt (1998), this disappearance of the public also means
an eradication of the political. When the public loses its true
purpose, as a place where individuals can “leave the household and
enter the political realm, where all [are] equals” (p. 32), the political
and the conflicts of pluralism lose an arena to exist. Arendt noted
that people “have become entirely private, that is, they have been
deprived of seeing and hearing others, of being seen and being
heard by them” (p. 58). And given that “a [person] who [lives] only
a private life, who like the slave was not permitted to enter the
public realm, or like the barbarian had chosen not to establish such
a realm, [is] not fully human” (p. 38), the overwhelming social
nature of the modern world means that not only are people leading
more private lives, they are becoming less human. Even as the
private overtakes the public, it is important to note that the basis of
the public and the political rests in the pluralistic nature of
existence.
Like Schmitt, Arendt has taken an agonistic view of this
pluralism. She suggested that “only where things can be seen by
many in a variety of aspects without changing their identity, so that
those who are gathered around them know they see sameness in
utter diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably appear”
(Arendt, 1998, p. 57). Thus, conflict should never be cast aside or
dismissed, because differences in ideology provide us an opportunity to experience reality, as different views come into discussion in
the public sphere. For both Schmitt and Arendt, conflict begets the
political. More important, conflict is not destructive; instead, it is
an unavoidable necessity that provides opportunities for actionable
solutions in a pluralistic society.

The Political as Conciliation
In contrast to an conflictual approach to the political, Rawls (2005)
has offered a more conciliatory interpretation of the political. In
Political Liberalism, Rawls set out to answer whether it is “possible
for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal
citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious,
philosophical, and moral doctrines” (p. 4). Similar to Schmitt and
Arendt, Rawls recognizes the pluralistic nature of existence and its
ensuing conflicts. But instead of articulating the political in terms
of conflict, Rawls sees the political as a process of creating an
overlapping consensus among reasonable and rational, but
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incompatible, comprehensive doctrines. “In such a consensus, the
reasonable doctrines endorse the political conception, each from
its own points of view” (p. 134).
To achieve this overlapping consensus, Rawls (2005) suggested that individuals must be in “a fair system of cooperation
between free and equal citizens” (p. 22). This is achieved through
the original position behind a veil of ignorance. Under this veil,
citizens would be ignorant of any social or natural positioning that
may give them advantages or disadvantages when bargaining with
one another in the original position. The purpose of this original
position is to “eliminate the bargaining advantages that inevitably
arise within the background institutions of any society from
cumulative social, historical, and natural tendencies” (p. 23).
By creating an overlapping consensus in this egalitarian position,
a well-ordered society can be unified as each comprehensive
doctrine accepts the overlapping consensus in its own way. For
Rawls, the political is not found in the conflict of pluralism;
instead, it is a process of conciliation that is created through the
rational reasoning between pluralistic ideals.
Furthermore, Rawls’s conception of the political is separate
from moral and social conceptions. Rawls (2005) saw the political
as a standalone concept that “can be endorsed by widely different
and opposing though reasonable comprehensive doctrines” (p. 38).
Since many reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral
doctrines can still oppose one another, Rawls proposed a political
domain where individuals’ “overall views have two parts: one part
can be seen to be, or to coincide with, the publicly recognized
political conception of justice; the other part is a (fully or partially)
comprehensive doctrine to which the political conception is in
some manner related” (p. 38). This articulation of the political is a
deliberative public space where varying perspectives can come to
agree on a conception of justice. But this means that irreconcilable
aspects of comprehensive doctrines are left out of the political.
Rawls’s notion of the political is removed from cultural, moral, and
social backgrounds, and it requires individuals to be “part of a
political ideal of democratic citizenship that includes the idea of
public reason” (p. 62). When individuals practice public reason,
they create the political “from shared fundamental ideas implicit
in the public political culture in the hope of developing from them
a political conception that can gain free and reasoned agreement in
judgment, this agreement being stable in virtue of its gaining the
support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive
doctrines” (p. 101). In sum, this articulation of the political consists
of reasonable, free, and equal individuals cooperating together in
reciprocity to formulate a conception of justice as fairness—
working together cooperatively in hopes of reaching consensus or
at least narrowing differences. Whereas Rawls depended on an
original position, removed from moral and social doctrines, to
reconcile conflicts that arise from pluralistic existence, Habermas
conceived of a conciliatory approach to the political that focuses on
open discussion and deliberation.
While Habermas also saw the political as a process of determining principles of justice that all might agree on, his approach
does not require the political domain to be separate from moral,
philosophical, and social doctrines. Habermas’s articulation of the
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political focuses on political participation that can be realized in
moral and cultural realms as well as the political domain (Benhabib, 1993). Once again, pluralism and conflicts of differences are
at the basis of the political; however, the Habermasian process
relies on practical discourses and deliberations as procedures to
encourage reconciliation, instead of the original position. Like
Arendt, Habermas suggested that practical discourse must occur
in the public sphere. But unlike Arendt’s notion of the public, this
“public sphere comes into existence whenever and wherever all
affected by general social and political norms of action engage in a
practical discourse, evaluating their validity” (Benhabib, 1993,
p. 87). To put it in dialogic terms, the public sphere is “a theater in
modern societies in which political participation is enacted
through the medium of talk. It is the space in which citizens
deliberate about their common affairs, and hence an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction” (Fraser, 1993, p. 110).
Since this deliberative model no longer separates an overlapping
consensus from comprehensive doctrines, conflicts between these
pluralistic views can threaten the political process of determining
principles of justice that all can agree on. Even though Rawls and
Habermas conceived of different procedures to reconcile conflicts of
differences, both saw the political as a process of reaching an agreement or mutual understanding. Meanwhile, Schmitt and Arendt
embraced unresolved conflicts as an essential part of the political.

Attending to Agonism and the
Political in Democratic Education
Deliberation by Contrast
In order to show how agonism and the political may contribute
to democratic education, let me first present, by contrast, a generic
deliberative model for democratic education. In his Educational
Researcher article, Parker (2006) suggested that purposeful
classroom discussions may help students develop what Allen
(2004) called “a citizenship of political friendship” (p. 140), where
students learn to view each other as political friends. Working with
Aristotle’s (1999) conception of political friendship, Allen (2004)
argued that students do not need to develop emotional affinity
toward one another; however, being political friends does require
students to respect one another as equals in order to obtain
“rational consensus” (Habermas, 1990) through deliberation.
Parker (2010) contended that classroom seminars and deliberations
can function as miniature versions of democratic deliberations,
where students are given opportunities to speak and listen to
“strangers” (i.e., fellow citizens and peers) with reciprocity,
humility, and caution. The ultimate goal is to help students develop
a better sense of “others” so that there might be a greater degree of
equity or commonality among them.
This deliberative model has aspects of a Rawlsian process—
creating an overlapping consensus among reasonable and rational,
but incompatible, comprehensive doctrines behind a veil Students
are asked to view each other as reasonable and rational beings,
whose opinions and views deserve to be heard. It also leans on
Habermas’s (1984) notion that preconditions of the communicative
process must be in place to ensure the rationality of arguments in
deliberative discourses, especially since discourse only occurs when
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one supposes “that a rationally motivated argument could in
principle be achieved” (p. 42). Communicative rationality and
reason2 are bound to the “internal relations between the semantic
context of [people’s] expressions, their conditions of validities, and
the reasons to (which could be provided of necessary) for the truth
of statements or for the effectiveness of actions” [sic] (p. 9). In other
words, students must all learn to communicate in a reasonable and
logical manner.
Habermas (1993) pointed out that a discourse-centered
“approach has the advantage of being able to specify the preconditions for communication that have to be fulfilled in the various
forms of rational debate and in negotiations if the results of such
discourses are to be presumed to be rational” (p. 448). By participating in this deliberative process, students with different backgrounds can help determine principles of justice and courses of
action for the community without compromising their belief
systems, as long as they are rational. Even in situations where
conciliation does not seem possible, Habermas suggested that
some compromise or consensus can be reached through deliberation, especially if it is “the rationally motivated but fallible result
of a discussion . . . that has come temporarily to a close because
coming to a decision could no longer be postponed” (p. 450).
This means that if students learn to respect one another’s rational
motivations, compromises achieved through a deliberative process
have a better chance of being honored. However, this process can
only be successful if students participate rationally or accept that
being rational within the system is the only way forward.
Many civic education scholars share a deliberative view of the
political. Abowitz and Harnish’s (2006) review found that the
deliberative model was a key category for contemporary discourses
of citizenship. Civic scholars often view deliberative discourses as a
way to promote liberal ideals in the classroom, because they
provide an avenue for differing views to coexist within a public
space (e.g., Callan, 2004; Gutmann, 1999; Hess and McAvoy, 2014;
Parker, 2003; Youniss and Levine, 2009). While scholars may
disagree on the philosophical basis for deliberation (e.g., Benhabib,
1996), they believe deliberation is an important process of legitimizing any decision-making. In order to help students understand
how decisions are made rationally, schools can provide students
opportunities to participate in this public process of exchanging
ideas and making decisions (e.g., through the discussion of
controversial issues [Hess, 2009]).
By presenting the political as a process of conciliation,
democratic educators can help students learn to create a stable and
rational democratic atmosphere through deliberation. Furthermore, practicing this political process requires students to have “an
account of certain political virtues—the virtues of fair social
cooperation such as the virtues of civility and tolerance, of
reasonableness and the sense of fairness” (Rawls, 2005, p. 194). In
other words, practicing and learning to deliberate (i.e., talking and
listening to strangers) in the classroom might help students
become more rational and reasonable.
2 See volume 1 of Habermas’s (1984) Theory of Communicative Action
for a detailed discussion on communicative rationality and reason.
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However, these conciliatory processes often overlook strong
emotive structures that may be at the root of conflicts, which may
be detrimental to eventual political engagement.3 Deliberative
models also assume existing systems are rational, even if some
students find them oppressive. While it is important for students to
learn how to discuss controversial issues in a civil manner, the
rational deliberative process may suppress antagonistic feelings
that gave rise to the original conflict and leave students feeling
demoralized or disenfranchised. In other words, students may feel
like strangers are only willing to listen and talk about the issues that
are rational, rather than to listen to and validate their feelings on
difficult issues that are incommensurable with societal norms.
These students may be discouraged due to their past negative
experiences with a system that teachers hope they might engage
with (Rubin, 2006). If marginalized groups do not feel like they
have a seat at the Habermasian table, even when invited to the
conversation, they may perceive the structure to be oppressive or
unsympathetic to their views. Worse, feelings of disempowerment
may be entrenched further by a deliberative framework that hopes
to leave students with a “feel good” or “everyone is a winner”
perception. This push toward consensus building or rational
compromise may circumvent the very power structures that
students should confront or challenge.
An example of this can be seen when students bring up issues
around the #blacklivesmatter movement in the United States, only
to be met with counter arguments about how #alllivesmatter. Even
though the narrative of #alllivesmatter points to the democratic
virtues of fair social cooperation, civility, and tolerance, it has the
effect of belittling the call to shed light on specific systematic
injustices met by Black Americans.4 Groups of individuals who
feel oppressed by the system may view generic, all-encompassing
movements as patronizing to their original cause. This is not to say
that deliberation is not important; on the contrary, deliberation
offers a way for students to see the importance of pluralism
firsthand. However, a model of democratic education that
seemingly proclaims #allperspectivesmatter may not be very
empowering. An infusion of agonism into deliberations, on the
other hand, may be able to capitalize on students’ differing
perspectives for eventual political involvement.

Agonism Explored
Mouffe (2000) saw democracy as a system that allows for competition between interests, rather than a system of rational consensus
building. Given the oppositional (or agonistic) nature of Mouffe’s
conception of democracy, students could learn how to deal with
these competing interests as a way to fully understand and participate in a democracy. By agonism, I draw on Ruitenberg’s (2009)
work to mean an approach to the political that accepts the pervasiveness of political conflict and seeks to channel that conflict
positively, as opposed to minimizing or eliminating the conflict
3 Studies have shown that open deliberation may actually depress
political engagement (Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004; Mutz, 2006).
4 See the interview with Judith Butler on “What’s Wrong with ‘All Lives
Matter’?” (2015).
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rationally. Rather than ignoring emotive and irrational aspects of
comprehensive doctrines, agonism in democratic education
attempts to help students understand the conflicts behind incommensurable beliefs and channel these conflicts for productive ends.
Ruitenberg (2009) referred to this process as learning about
“political emotions,” which can help guide or fuel students’ political
thoughts and actions.
Given that “the political can be understood only in the context
of the very present possibility of the friend-and-enemy grouping”
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 35), teaching students to be unified citizens in a
pluralistic society through an agonistic framework can seem
counterintuitive. However, it is important to point out that agonism
is different from antagonism. While antagonism seeks to avoid or
conquer a hostile enemy, agonism anticipates to face and struggle
with a dissimilar adversary. This distinction is important because
“an adversary is a legitimate enemy, an enemy with whom we have
in common a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of
democracy” (Mouffe, 1999, p. 755). Instead of following deliberative ideals of seeing a common humanity in the other, agonism
suggests that even if students do not see others the same way they
see themselves, they can still struggle with them as worthy
adversaries. If educators can help students see people who are
different from them as valuable adversaries instead of enemies,
“conflict in and of itself is not a problem to be overcome, but rather
a force to be channeled into political and democratic commitments” (Ruitenberg, 2009, p. 272). Any conflicts that arise with
one’s adversaries can be channeled into negotiations and action—
the vita activa that is required for human existence—instead of
sidestepped in favor of rationality.
A key to understanding this approach to democratic education is that in agonism, “the prime task of democratic politics is not
to eliminate passions nor to relegate them to the private sphere in
order to render rational consensus possible, but to [mobilize] those
passions towards the promotion of democratic designs” (Mouffe,
1999, pp. 755–756). This means students would not have to give up
their comprehensive doctrines, set aside their emotive passions, or
abide by rational preconditions in order to participate in the
political. Unlike other deliberative models that require students to
set aside their emotions in order to logically consider the rights of
others, an agonistic deliberative model allows students to hold
onto their passions.
Since students may not necessarily be rational in their
negotiations (unlike in a generic deliberative model of democratic
education), it becomes necessary for students to recognize people
who are different from them as adversaries. “To come to accept the
position of the adversary is to undergo a radical change in political
identity, it has more of a quality of a conversion than of rational
persuasion” (Mouffe, 1999, p. 755). While this type of conversion
may occur through conversations or discussions, the end goal is
not simply to be rationally persuaded but to undergo a deeper
transformative understanding of the situation or the adversary.
Instead of having students engage in political tolerance, which sets
aside differences temporarily to logically consider the rights
available to everyone, agonism asks students to transform their
ideas about the world. Instead of just putting their difference on
democracy & education, vol 25, n-o 1

hold for the sake of human rights, the agonistic process encourages
students to challenge their own positionalities (as well as one
another’s positions) in the conflict. Through this process, students
may learn that compromises are possible, but they are only
“temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation” (Mouffe, 1999,
p. 755). In other words, public deliberation does not reconcile
differences as it does in Rawls’s view or create a logical haven as it
does in Habermas’s views; instead, it is an arena through which
ongoing conflicts are continuously renegotiated as people come to
understand one another’s existences in deeper ways.
Agonism can help students learn how to negotiate and
develop the capacity for renegotiation, rather than just skills of
logical deliberation for compromise or consensus. For emphasis,
negotiation is not the same as consensus and compromise.
Consensus and compromise mean something like finding a point
on which all can agree or agreeing that an agreement cannot be
reached, whereas negotiations means coming to an actionable next
step even if all are not satisfied with the results. For Habermas,
compromise occurs when the conversation ends, because deliberations naturally have endings. Negotiation is more than just a
compromise, because negotiations allude to practical implications,
with inferences of potential iterations of the current negotiated
terms—a future time when the terms might lead to different
practical implications. In a sense, all negotiations are temporary
and strategic—temporary because, like Habermas suggested,
conversations end, but strategic because the negotiable terms are
not bounded by rationality. In a political process of constant
negotiation and renegotiation, students might learn to practice
Arendt’s notion of forgiveness, because action “needs forgiving,
dismissing, in order to make it possible for life to go on by constantly releasing [people] from what they have done unknowingly.
Only through this constant mutual release from what they do can
[people] remain free agents, only by constant willingness to change
their minds and start again can they be trusted with so great a
power as that to begin something new” (Arendt, 1998, p. 240). By
actively facing and struggling with conflicts that exists in a
pluralistic society, students can explore the underlining power
relationships within those conflicts, and perhaps become empowered in the process to take action, since negotiations yield actionable plans.
Rather than to suggest that agonism is somehow better than
deliberation, I wish to suggest that agonism can be coupled
with deliberation to help make discussions in the classroom more
meaningful for marginalized students. One way to incorporate
agonism into the classroom is by implementing curricula that are
centered on deliberation. But instead of focusing only on the
consensus-making powers of logical deliberation, teachers can
guide students into conversations for negotiation and transformation. “There is evidence that participating in controversial issues
discussions can build pro-democratic values (such as tolerance),
enhance content understanding, and cause students to engage more
in the political world” (Hess, 2009, p. 32). At the same time, students
might learn to practice agonistic deliberation with one another,
where they are asked to bring forth their emotions and their sense of
fairness and justice (or injustice) rather than to simply look for
feature article
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logical commonalities between themselves and their peers.
Agonistic deliberation might help create spaces where students can
express their underlining ideas, emotions, and perspectives on
controversial issues more openly.
An agonistic-deliberative classroom may provide students
with opportunities to recognize, understand, and evaluate different
belief systems, not just logically in order to develop political
tolerance, but emotively in order to be fundamentally changed. It is
possible that deliberation may achieve this goal without agonism,
since perspective-broadening dialogue is at the heart of deliberation and discussion. However, a generic deliberative model may
further ostracize students who already feel like the system is
against them. Agonistic deliberation, on the other hand, would
take great care to validate students’ perspectives no matter how
bizarre, jarring, or irrational they may seem. All perspectives
would need to be taken into account when students begin to
discuss actionable solutions to issues, not just the ones sanctioned
by existing norms (e.g., anthropocentric ideas established by
Western philosophy).
Through strategically crafted conversations, teachers may
prompt students to consider the emotions that one may feel when
they are oppressed by systemic injustices or come up with creative
processes to negotiate and renegotiate norms to help transform one
another’s ideas about an issue. For students who are marginalized
by the status quo, these poignant conversations may help validate
their feelings, realities, and ideas—even when they differ from the
majority point of view. The ultimate goal of agonism is not just
political tolerance but for future transformation—transformation
of how everyone in the class perceives their realities. Even though
students may see that transformation does not happen quickly, nor
can it be accomplished without renegotiations, they may begin
to understand the importance of forgiveness—of oneself and of
others—for the injustices that will likely occur during (re)negotiations. Agonism, when combined with deliberation, offers a more
practical and realistic look at politics and democratic processes,
rather than to cover the political in a veil of ignorance or expect
everyone to behave as angels.5

Debate and Structured Academic
Controversy: Agonistic Deliberation
The pluralistic nature of our society is nowhere more evident than
in public schools, where students often interact with individuals
who are different from them. Two classroom practices that can
provide students with opportunities to engage in agonistic
deliberation are debate and Structured Academic Controversy
(SAC). Traditionally, both debates and SAC (but SAC especially)
are seen as instructional strategies for deliberative models of
education (see Parker, 2006). In the paragraphs below, I show how
both strategies can be modified to become agonistic deliberation
tools. While the two differ in their approaches to controversial
5 Refer to James Madison’s famous Federalist #51 quote “If men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary” (Hamilton, Madison, Jay, & Kessler, 2000, p. 344).
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issues, the examples show how agonistic deliberation might help
empower students.
Debates are often used in classrooms as engaging activities
that get students to discuss contentious issues (Bonwell & Eison,
1991; Chiodo & Byford, 2004; Levstik, 2008). They tend to elicit a
competitive spirit among students that can trigger deeper political
emotions. Even the procedural process of the debate mirrors
constant conflict and dissonance as students offer arguments and
rebuttals on a resolution. At the same time, the process of formulating logical arguments for a formal debate can minimize the
emotive (and subsequently the agonistic) aspects of students’
positions. A well-crafted debate that seeks to infuse agonism into
the conversation could ask students to draw up negotiations at the
end of the debate, instead of ending on a definitive winner or loser.
Understandably, by doing so, the activity may deviate from formal
debate formats, but this alternative negotiations ending can help
students draw on their political emotions and to consider not only
the (sometimes combative) disagreements between the two sides,
but also how to best move forward for both sides in the meantime.
In this way, a stereotypically conflict-oriented activity like a debate
can be transformed into an agonistic deliberation activity that may
inspire students to further engage on the issue.
Another classroom practice that has potential to help students
practice agonistic deliberation is a Structured Academic Controversy (SAC). In its original form, a SAC introduces students to
controversial issues that have been dichotomized by a yes or no
question (e.g., Should our country accept Syrian refugees?); assigns
students to one side of the issue; and asks them to present their
arguments to the other side after some time of preparation
(Johnson & Johnson, 1985). SAC is different from a debate because
students do not prepare rebuttals to directly refute each other’s
claims (and therefore, no direct conflict occurs). Instead, after both
sides present their arguments, they come together to try and reach
a consensus on the issue. Unlike debate (which is a good example
of antagonism and conflict), SAC is a good example of the deliberative process, where students are asked to logically deliberate an
issue, mostly without their own opinions (remember that students
are assigned to a side regardless of their actual feelings on the
matter), and come to a consensus at the end. Students could also be
asked to drop their assigned positions after the consensus step in
order to discuss their actual opinions and feelings about the topic
(Parker, 2011). However, as mentioned above, logical deliberative
processes may leave students dissatisfied or disgruntled because
they had to leave their feelings aside for the sake of coming to a
consensus or compromise.
Even though the “drop your role” step broaches the political
emotions that students may feel, agonism can be further infused
into SAC by asking students to drop their roles prior to the
consensus step. And instead of consensus, students can be asked to
negotiate an actionable solution (rather than a consensus, since the
goal is to highlight differences) to the current issue—a plan that
everyone can get behind and participate in for the moment. This
way, students have an opportunity to discuss the issue with not
only the logical arguments that they have prepared but also their
actual feelings on the topic—to engage with the issue as themfeature article
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selves. It may be helpful for the teacher to remind students that
all negotiations are temporary and that as situations change, the
negotiated terms will inevitably shift. This process of negotiations,
rather than consensus, may help transform students’ ideas and
thinking about the issue, the factors surrounding the issue, or at
least how they perceive possible solutions to the issue. By changing
these steps in SAC, the deliberation becomes more practical,
action-oriented, agonistic, and rooted in political emotions and
can help students grapple with how to engage with political
conflicts.
In agonistic deliberations (either through debates or SAC),
teachers should allow students to convey their ideas and feelings in
authentic ways and then challenge students to come up with
negotiated action steps that address the issue. Rather than providing only rational evidence to logically back up their assertions,
students can provide anecdotal stories or experiences that give rise
to their thinking. Alternative narratives to ways of thinking about
an issue could also be incorporated into agonistic deliberations.
For example, when discussing how best to curb climate change,
students may be allowed to present not only scientific data but also
cultural narratives that provide insights into the issue. Or on issues
of abortion, religious texts and ideology might be presented as
part of the discussion. In both cases, it is valuable for students to
voice their own perceptions and ideas—even at the risk of
conflict—rather than to silence their perspectives. And all of this,
on the way to negotiated action steps, since the end goal is empowerment and action.

Conclusion: Agonistic
Deliberation in the Public Sphere
Besides providing students with a space for transformation
through negotiations, agonistic deliberations offer educators one
important lesson—a need to bolster the public arena. For all the
disagreements about the political, one thing is constant: It can only
exist in the public, because pluralism and its conflicts are manifested through the gathering of different ideologies in a public
space. Even though the public is where pluralism and the political
come into being, Arendt (1998) lamented that “society always
demands that its members act as though they [are] members of one
enormous family which has only one opinion and one interest”
(p. 39). This socialization creates normalized behavior, which
“excludes the possibility of action” (p. 40) because pluralism is
absolved. In becoming more socialized, people become less
political. As Arendt warned, the “enlargement of the private, the
enchantment, as it were, of a whole people, does not make it
public . . . on the contrary, [it] means only that the public realm
has almost completely receded” (p. 53).
Given that a goal of democratic education is to create future
citizens who are enlightened and engaging, the waning of the
public is a cause for concern. Students need opportunities to learn
how to interact with one another for public good and not be
isolated in an increasingly individualized world or socialized into
their own segregated communities. The privatization of schools,
universities, and political processes means that public spaces for
the political need to be reclaimed. If these spaces vanish, where
democracy & education, vol 25, n-o 1

might future citizens face pluralism, deliberate contentious issues,
and resolve to act? Democratic educators can help preserve
the public arena by helping students practice agonism through
the political so as to better understand its importance for our
pluralistic democracy.
The future of a democracy will always rest in the hands of its
citizens and how its citizens handle and navigate the conflicts that
inevitably arise from pluralism. For young people to become
more invested in politics, they need opportunities to engage with
public interests that are inevitably inundated with differing
viewpoints and conflicts. Even though agonism can seem to
champion differences and dissent,6 at its heart, agonism hopes for
the transformation of a future that will be better for everyone. By
teaching students to harness their political emotions, navigate
political conflicts, and negotiate actionable solutions, agonistic
deliberation has the potential to empower students to engage
with the conflict of differences that exist in a pluralistic society.
If agonistic deliberation can help students learn to negotiate,
forgive, and harness their political emotions for renegotiation,
they may feel more empowered to enter into a political system that
seem to have left them behind. Through this process, students
may learn that while power may never be defused, the struggle is
always worthwhile.
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